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Imagination, Power and Freedom 
MOIRA GATENS* 
When Plato banned the poets from his ideal Republic he perhaps 
initiated the now long-standing antagonism between philosophy 
and literature, between reason and the imagination, and between 
truth and meaning. Yet, as Michele Le Doeuff has observed, 
when one reads philosophy one encounters 'statues that breathe 
the scent of roses, ... clocks, horses, donkeys and even a lion ... 
scenes of sea and storm, forests and trees ... '. I Plato himself 
made extensive use of metaphors, images and imaginary scenes 
-amongst the more famous, that of the cave dwellers who mistake 
the shadows on the wall for reality. Nor is this reliance on stories 
peculiar to the Ancients. Contemporary philosophy tells us stories 
about what it might be like to be a bat, asks us to choose fair social 
arrangements whilst imagining ourselves behind a veil of 
ignorance, and engages in thought experiments which place 
Brown's brain in Smith's body and then asks: who have we got 
here, Smith or Brown? 
Why do philosophers, whose purported specialist tool of 
trade is reason, engage in these 'flights of the imagination'? One 
explanation is that thought experiments, imagining things other-
wise, allow us to draw out and test the reliability of our intuitions 
about, for example, justice or personal identity. Such stories allow 
us to explore if, and if so how, our intuitions might shift if we 
imaginatively alter some of the familiar conditions. This is the 
likely reasoning behind Frank Jackson's thought expeliment about 
Mary and her black-and-white life. If you find physicalism a 
plausible theory about the world then what would you say in 
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response to Jackson's imaginary story? 
Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through 
black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and-
white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know 
about the physical nature of the world .... If physicalism is true, she 
knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise is to suppose 
that there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is just 
what physicalism denies .... It seems, however, that Mary does not 
know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black-and-
white room ... she will learn what it is like to see something red, 
say. This is rightly described as learning-she wiIl not say 'ho 
hum'. Hence, physicalism is false. 2 
This thought experiment does not work for me. I find it difficult 
even to get to the stage of testing my intuitions about physicalism. 
Instead I find myself wondering if this imaginary Mary has a 
body similar to those of women in the actual world, most of 
whom frequently, monthly in fact, experience the colour red. 
Indeed, I find myself wondering if Mary is a disembodied being 
-a pure 'intellect'. Perhaps my failure to put the story to work in 
the context of the theory of physicalism indicates my unsuitabili ty 
to pursue philosophy-at least of this kind-since I am clearly 
'missing the point'. But the point I wish to make is that the ways 
in which philosophers imagine things like justice and personal 
identity and, more generally, the way the world 'is' do matter 
quite a lot. Moreover, the way in which such topics are imagined 
typically involve the tendency to fail to note the specificity of 
embodiment, that is, that the human body is always male or female, 
racially marked, and so on. The validity, 3 or otherwise, of such 
imaginative ways of thinking does not interest me so much as do 
the effects of such thinking on actually existing people. Whose 
imagination is being exercised, and about whom, seem to me to 
be very important questions. They draw attention to the fact that 
the imagination is always embodied and so always situated-it is 
always the imagination of this or that particular philosopher, or 
of this or that particular group of philosophers. Indeed, the 
introduction of this or that 'story' in a philosophical debate often 
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functions as a 'badging' signal. It can act to identify a philosopher 
as a member of a particular school of thought. 
I am not, of course, criticising anyone's prerogative to exercise 
the imagination. As I will argue shortly, to imagine is essential to 
what it is to be human-to exist as an embodied being in a human 
world means to exist as more than a mind or intellect. What con-
cems me here is the tendency within philosophy to fail to note the 
central role the imagination plays in philosophical theories about 
the world and the effects that follow from this central, though 
unacknowledged, role. With few exceptions, philosophers tend to 
view the imagination as an infelior faculty that is most frequently 
associated with enor or with the absence ofknowledge.4 As such, 
it is deemed to be unworthy of a close and careful analysis. 
One exception is Eva Brann's magisterial study of the 
imagination. Brann shows that in spite of the fact that the 
imagination 'functions as the interface of world and mind', acting 
as 'a pivot between sense and intellect', it nevertheless remains 
'the missing mystery of philosophy'.5 This 'mysterious' absence 
of any sustained analysis of the imagination gives it extraordinary 
power precisely because its constitutive role in our knowledge 
about the world goes largely unnoticed. This is, perhaps, relatively 
harmless in the case of Jackson's Mary. But when we tum to the 
uses of the imagination in political life and theory, the problem 
of failing to acknowledge the powers of the imagination can be 
sobering. As Brann rightly points out, ' ... the imagination of 
citizens is ... the deepest force of political life. Certainly its 
pathology, its excesses, and deficiencies, are responsible for those 
publicly orchestrated enormities, from the Right or the Left, that 
have tumed history into a theater of tragedies'.6 
In my previous research I have written about the way in which 
a founding story in political philosophy, namely, social contract 
theory, has functioned historically to constitute a form of 
sociability and citizenship that excluded women (and others, for 
example, peoples judged to be 'inferior races'). Moreover, I have 
argued that such stories have played a large role in the constitution 
of what, along with others, I have called the 'social imaginary'.7 
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I understand this phrase to include those images, symbols, 
metaphors and nanatives that help structure fonTIs of identity, 
and belonging, social meaning and value, and which, because 
they appeal to the imaginative faculty, attract strong affective 
investments. Cornelius Castoriadis dramatically draws attention 
to the importance of the imagination for the very existence of 
human societies. He writes: 
Hegel has said that man is a sick animal. In truth, man is a mad 
animal, totally unfit for life, a species which would have disappeared 
as soon as it emerged, if it had not proven itself capable, at the 
collective level, of another creation: society in the strict sense, that 
is, institutions embodying social imaginary significations.8 
These diverse significations will, of course, vary from culture to 
culture and even within a single culture, but they are essential 
and permanent elements in the creation, maintenance and revision 
of the meanings through which every culture makes sense of 
itself and offers justification for the variable status of its members. 
The differential status of the members of any given society will 
also affect the social distribution of agency, including the power 
to revise the social values that give order and meaning to life-
whether these are religious, cultural or moral values. So my claim 
is that the social imaginary significantly contributes to the social 
harms and benefits experienced by those whose subjectivities 
and behaviours are shaped by it. 
Unlike some Marxist or neo-Marxist approaches I do not 
identify these imaginaries (for they are plural) with ideology (or 
false consciousness). Such a claim may be taken to imply that a 
'true' or 'non-imaginative' consciousness is attainable. My view 
is that truth is simply the wrong register in which to attempt to 
understand the generation of the kind of meaningful behaviour 
that is vital to all forn1s of sociability. Imagination is wrongly 
conceived as truth's contrary. Rather, it should be acknowledged 
that sociability itself depends on the power of the imagination to 
bind together individuals, both temporally and affectively. As 
Benedict Anderson, in much-quoted lines, holds: 'all communities 
larger than primordial villages (and perhaps even these) are 
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imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/ 
genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined'.9 Two 
of the most common ways of imagining 'community' are through 
religious or political stories; and these two story lines are never 
easily separated. In the West, from at least the seventeenth century, 
a central story about the legitimacy, or otherwise, of extant 
distributions of power and freedom has been contractarianism. In 
some ways, social contract theory may be seen to mark a break 
from theologically organised societies to political, or secular, 
societies; from societies based in fixed 'status' to those based in 
free 'contract'. It would take a book, rather than a lecture, to do 
justice to the complexity of social contract theory. All I can offer 
here is a very brief sketch of the barest outlines of its development 
and then argue for the effects that I take it to have had in the past, 
and to continue to have, in the present. 
The core of modem social contract theory is associated with 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke in the seventeenth century, and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the eighteenth century. The basic idea 
is that human life without political order would be barbaric, or, 
in Hobbes' famous words: life in the state of nature would be 
'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'. Each 'man' (as the 
philosophers say) cannot enjoy his right to do whatever he can, 
and to retain possession of his goods, when every other 'man' 
bears the same right. Thus, men will need to come together to 
agree upon certain binding rules of conduct if each is to enjoy his 
life and convert his vulnerable possessions into property. The 
right of one man to do all he can must be limited by respect for 
the rights of others. Political society is thus born from fear (of 
other men's violence and acquisitiveness) and from the desire for 
peace and security. 
In spite of the colourful stories that Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau provide of 'natural' man and pre-political life, 
contemporary political theorists insist that these stories about life 
in the state of nature are mere hypotheses or useful fictions. The 
story of social contract should be understood as another 'just so' 
or 'as if' thought experiment. Contemporary political philosophers 
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typically claim that social contract theory is really about the 
grounds on which one can justify present political authority, 
including an account of the rights and obligations of the rulers and 
the ruled. This interpretation of social contract theory rejects the 
idea that an historical contract ever took place. Furthelmore, when 
Immanuel Kant pronounced that the notion of social contract is 
'an idea of reason', the role played by the imagination of the 
previous social contract philosophers is obscured. Social contract 
theory now is seen as a device of reason, not a speculative tale. 
Consistent with at least the early approach of John Rawls, social 
contract theory comes to be recast as an instance of rational actor 
theory.1O In order to discover whether present poli tical authority 
and social institutions are justified, we need to ask: 'would a 
rational, self-interested actor consent to these arrangements'? 
There are a number of problems with this reinterpretation of 
social contract theory. For a start it encourages us to lose sight of 
the historical context in which modem social contract theory arose 
and the specificity of the debates it engendered. Losing sight of 
this history runs the risk of failing to understand adequately the 
puzzles which that context and those debates have bequeathed to 
the present. At the end of the paper I will attempt to unravel this 
dubious bequest in relation to twentieth-century conceptions of 
universal human rights. To reiterate an earlier point, the re-
articulation of social contract theory as a species of rational actor 
theory obscures the historical questions: who was revising the 
dominant social imaginary and for whom? For example, Locke's 
disagreement with Sir Robert Filmer, conceming the validity of 
patriarchal right, was not concemed with the right of men over 
women but with the right of fathers over sons. On Filmer's view, 
the right of monarchs over their subjects, like the rights of fathers 
over their sons, had been passed down from Adam since creation. 
The challenge presented by the idea of man's natural right to 
I iberty was, first and foremost, a challenge to some men's authOlity 
over other men. As Carole Pateman has so ably shown, modem 
social contract theory announces a new form of sociability: 
'fratemal patriarchy' .11 The 'fathers' were defeated and the new 
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social order is a fraternal pact, based in convention and consent. 
This is not to say that the social contract theDIists were uninterested 
in the question of what should be the proper relation between 
women and men. Whilst men become brothers in civil society, 
woman's relation to civil society was to be mediated through her 
father/husband as head of the household. Social contract theorists 
were not in the business of challenging male authority in all its 
fDIms. Nor, if we take humanity to include women, were they 
concerned with the promotion of human equality. The transition 
to a 'revolutionary' modemity was not to be revolutionary for 
women. To show the strictly limited nature of this challenge to 
authority allow me to consider some of Rousseau's comments 
from The Social Contract: 
Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force 
creates no right, we must conclude that conventions form the basis 
of all legitimate authority among men. 12 
To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the 
rights of humanity and even its duties. For him who renounces 
everything no indemnity is possible. Such a renunciation is 
incompatible with man's nature; to remove all liberty from his will 
is to remove all morality from his acts. Finally, it is an empty and 
contradictory convention that sets up, on the one side, absolute 
authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience.13 
One may be forgiven for thinking that when Rousseau uses 'man' 
and 'men', he is doing so in the generic or inclusive sense. 
Certainly, his use of 'humanity' in the phrase 'the rights of 
humanity' would encourage the assumption that he means 
'humankind' when he writes 'man'. But this assumption is false. 
'Man' and 'men' in these passages were not, unfortunately, 
intended to include 'woman' or 'women'. While authority among 
men is deemed conventional, authority between men and women, 
according to Rousseau, is natural and, moreover, 'rational'. But 
Rousseau does not argue for women's subordination in his political 
treatise, The Social Contract. He writes an additional text, an 
imaginative novel, in fact, entitled Emile, or On Education. 
Consider the following quotations from Emile: 
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When woman complains of the unjust inequality which man has 
imposed on her, she is wrong; this inequality is not a human 
institution, or at least it is not the work of prejudice but of reason: 
that one of the sexes to whom nature has entrusted the children must 
answer for them to the other. 14 
It is presumably this fact of the natural procreative difference 
between the sexes that dictates the 'severe restraint' that must be 
imposed on the liberty of girls and women: 
[O]ne must impose restraint on them from the start, so that it will 
never be a hardship for them, so as to master all their fantasies and 
make them submit to the wills of other people .... This habitual 
restraint results in a docility in women which they need al1 their 
lives, since they will always be in subjection to a man or to men's 
judgements, and will never be allowed to set themselves above 
these judgements.15 
Regardless of what contemporary political philosophers claim 
about the meaning of social contract, these two sets of quotations 
from Rousseau highlight a paradox in the history of social contract 
theory-a paradox that, as I will show, remains with us today. 
This paradox was noted and exploited by Mary Wollstonecraft, 
among others. On the one hand, we have the claim that 'to 
renounce liberty' is to sUlTender the rights and duties of humanity. 
On the other hand, we have the necessity of women's submission 
to men. On the one hand, we have the claim that without liberty 
of will, morality is absent. On the other hand, women must 'submit 
to the wills of other people'. On the one hand, we have the claim 
that it is 'an empty and contradictory convention that sets up, on 
the one side, absolute authority, and, on the other, unlimited 
obedience'. On the other hand, we have the view that women 
must obey and should never be allowed to set themselves above 
men's authority. 
These two sets of quotations exemplify a paradox in the 
traditional conception of humanity. At base, the problem is the 
very fact of sexual difference, that is, the fact that human life 
is double: man and woman. Yet one half of humanity, man, has 
had by far the major say in how and why this fact should be made 
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socially, ethically, and politically meaningful. It is mostly 
one kind of body, one kind of imagination, one set of affective 
investments, which have framed the terms through which 
'humanity' is grasped. The result is plain: 'man' comes to coincide 
with 'humanity' and 'woman' comes to occupy a precarious 
position in relation to 'humanity'. As Wollstonecraft put it, woman 
is made into 'a fanciful kind of half-being'. 16 She is both 'man', 
that is, part of humanity, and 'not-man', that is, not entitled 
to all the rights of humanity. One might say, to echo Aristotle, that 
woman is non-normatively human. (AlistotIe, infamously, claimed 
that woman is a de-formed male.) But surely this phrase 'non-
nonnatively human' gives the game away? In a bizane reversal of 
the nature-norm distinction, what has been taken to be the way 
woman 'should be' renders her a non-nOlmative human being. 
Rousseau's Social Contract criticises an important element in 
his contemporary social imaginary, namely, the supposed natural 
authority of fathers over sons. His detractors respond that paternal 
authority is not a political convention; it is underwritten by Judeo-
Christian theology. But, as I have shown, Rousseau does not 
question the conventions, or norms, governing male-female 
relations. What he tries to do is to derive a norm of social 
organization from a natural fact, namely, that the facts of human 
reproduction give rise to women's subordination to man. This 
move is familiar but invalid. The essential underdetelmination of 
human being-what Castoriadis has called our 'madness', our 
'unfitness' for life-bars the legitimacy of any direct inference 
from the natural to the normative. Or, in David Hume's famous 
phrase, from the 'is' to the 'ought'. We have instincts-certainly-
but these are always affected by the material conditions under 
which they are expressed. Moreover, the expression of a human 
instinct or natural predisposition is always filtered through the 
social imaginaries that precede us. I have suggested that 
eighteenth-century debates about 'the woman question' may be 
framed as a debate about the relation between nature and norms. 
It may also be read as a battIe over social imaginary significations. 
A question of great interest to me, to which I will turn shortly, 
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concems how one should understand the relation between the 
nonnative and the imaginary. Re-reading the works of eighteenth-
century writers who argued for women's human rights, with this 
question in mind, is instructive. They can be seen to be battling 
with dominant interpretations of nature and convention, on one 
front, and with the larger social narratives, or imaginaries, that 
support these conventions, for example religion, on the other. 
Until relatively recently there was little knowledge about the 
intensity and frequency with which seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century political theorists and activists-both male and female-
debated what should be the proper rights and duties of men and 
women in social, economic and political life in the West. Thanks 
to the work of several feminist historians, such as Joan Scott, Joan 
Landes, Dorinda Outram, and many others, the details of these 
debates are now accessible to the non-specialist. l ? It is important 
to realise that women (and some men) were arguing for a 
reinterpretation of woman's nature and rights at precisely the 
same time that men's own self-understandings were radically 
shifting. As Carole Pateman has shown, the long revolution against 
patriarchal power, as far as the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
social contract theorists were concerned, ended in the defeat of 
the fathers by the sons: long live 'liberty, equality andfraternity'. 
But, as Wollstonecraft argued, the revolution in the 'rights of 
man' was incomplete because it failed to champion human rights, 
which necessarily must include women. Wollstonecraft dedicated 
her 1792 Vindication of the Rights of Woman to Charles Talleyrand, 
an influential force in the French Constituent Assembly, especially 
entrusted with the task of advising on public education in the new 
Republic. Among her appeals to Talleyrand is the following: 
[I]f women are to be excluded, without having a voice, from 
a participation of the natural rights of mankind, prove first, to ward 
off the charge of injustice and inconsistency, that they want reason 
-else this flaw in your NEW CONSTITUTION will ever shew that 
man must, in some shape, act like a tyrant, and tyranny, in whatever 
part of society it rears its brazen front, will ever undermine 
morality.l8 
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History provides many examples of women's claims that 
human rights, if they exist at all, must be rights able to be enjoyed 
by both men and women. Olympe de Gouges, an activist and 
theorist during the French Revolution, went so far as to draw up 
her own 'Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizen' (1791), 
the articles of which engage, point for point, the seventeen articles 
of the 1789 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen'. The 
latter 'Declaration' -an important touchstone for contemporary 
human rights discourses-is notable for the way its very title 
weds 'nature' and 'politics'. 'Man'-a 'natural' category-
asserts his natural right to the freedom to decide the parameters 
of his social and political existence as 'citizen'. De Gouges' 
'Declaration' is interesting for the way it stresses that the terms 
'man', 'citizen' or 'all' cannot be assumed to include women. 
Instead, where the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen' 
reads 'all citizens' de Gouges wrote 'all female and male citizens'. 
She also introduced rights specific to female embodiment, for 
example, a woman's right to name the father of her child. 19 The 
issue of women's rights was strenuously debated in France in the 
years immediately after de Gouges' Declaration. After the banning 
of women's clubs and societies in 1793, representatives of the 
new Republic made clear their opposition to women's rights. 
Chaumette, for example, rejected women's petition for citizenship 
in the following terms: 
Since when is it permitted to give up one's sex? Since when is it 
decent to see women abandoning the pious cares of their households, 
the cribs of their children, to come to public places, to harangues in 
the galleries, at the bar of the Senate? Is it to men that nature 
confided domestic cares? Has she given us breasts to feed our 
children?20 
Chaumette's line of reasoning is familiarly Rousseauian: in 
the case of man, nature guarantees rights and liberty; in the case 
of woman, nature dictates duty and subordination. 
De Gouges' 'Declaration' failed to influence the formation of 
the new French Republic just as Wollstonecraft's Vindication of 
the Rights of Woman failed to find much support in eighteenth-
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century English political circles. Women like Wollstonecraft 
and de Gouges did not significantly influence Enlightenment 
reinterpretations of what should count as ajust or legitimate polity. 
It was not that women were incapable of imagining different 
ways of organising social and political life. It was rather that 
their imaginings were not influential, at least in their own times, in 
debates about the role of Government in detern1ining the scope of 
natural and conventional authority. The result is that the unfinished 
business of the Enlightenment still haunts political philosophy 
today. 
The influence of these past interpretations of who we are, and 
what should be our modes of governance, remain with us today. 
The ways in which a community governs and imagines itself 
become embedded, over time, in institutions and normative ways 
of behaving. It is this longevity and resilience of the layers to our 
social institutions that call for analysis. Such analysis requires us 
to take seriously the ways in which the power of the imagination 
-both individual and collective-is constitutive of human 
sociability, as such. Failure to acknowledge the history of the 
struggle over whose imagination, whose innovations, whose 
challenges to convention, have had the force to shift the way we 
imagine our political communities, results in the continuing 
exclusion of women from political society. 
In order to flesh out this latter point a little, allow me to consider 
the United Nations 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.2 ! 
Even a cursory glance at this Declaration illustrates its structural 
similarities to the philosophies of social contract. The preamble to 
the Declaration states' ... the peoples of the United Nations have 
in the Charter reaffilmed their faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal 
rights of men and women ... '. This would have to count as 
progress! 
But now consider the following Articles: 
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
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Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference 
with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks 
upon his honour and reputation. 
Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change 
his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.' 
Let me, very briefly, note three things about these articles: 
(i) the reassertion of fratemity-or brotherhood-in the context 
of both freedom and equality, in Article 1. 
(ii) the male head of household assumption coupled with the privacy 
of the family and home, in Article 12, conflicts with women's 
rights to autonomy. Indeed, the family and the home have been 
shown to be key sites where women are often denied their 
rights. 
(iii) the guarantee of freedom of religion and religious practice, 
will conflict, in a very large number of cases, with women's 
rights-whether it be the right to non-interference, the right to 
divorce, or the right to equal treatment-all of which rights are 
guaranteed to every person elsewhere in the Declaration. 
These are just some of the more obvious examples of the 
repetition of the structural failure of social contract theory to 
guarantee woman's enjoyment of the rights that should be hers 
by virtue of her humanity. The very idea of human rights, in the 
case of women, is so tied up with the history of the ways in which 
'humanity' has been paradoxically conceived, as to render it totally 
problematic. The particular paradox that I have focussed on here 
concems 'humanity' as it has been conceived in the West. Two 
factors, however, make this problem broader than Westem thought 
and practices. First, the near universal reach of the United Nations 
Declaration means its influence is global. For very many women, 
worldwide, the familiar problem of their invisibility within the 
home makes it difficult to see how they may gain access to their 
rights as presently conceived. Second, comparative studies in 
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religion show that the paradoxical status of women as human but 
not-quite-human is a common feature of many religions, not just 
Judeo-Christian, (or, at least, dominant interpretations of religion). 
In 1979 a treaty against sex discrimination which specified 
particular women's rights, entitled the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDA W), attempted to ameliorate some of the problems with 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 22 CEDAW today 
holds the dubious distinction of attracting the greatest number of 
reservations of any UN legal instrument. Almost all of the 
reservations concern perceived threats to the autonomy of religion 
and cultural traditions. If there is anything universal about the 
human rights of women, it is this: the very idea of women's 
human rights is seen a threat to order, culture, and civilization. 
But the normatively interesting feature of the internation-
alisation of these debates and struggles, in the context of women's 
rights, is the way they reveal the sheer diversity of social 
imaginaties and nOlms concerning malTiage, reproduction, divorce, 
property inheritance, and so on. Furthennore, women worldwide 
are increasingly challenging the dominance of masculinist 
imaginaries within their own cultural contexts and are articulating 
their own counter-imaginaries. Now, before one can even hope to 
understand the institutions and the norms that govern relations 
between the sexes in any given society, one must first gain some 
understanding of the broader social imaginaries through which 
these nOlms and institutions justify their authority. The pretensions 
of human rights to be universal, again, confronts the particular, 
the embodied, the affective, in short, the imaginary social 
significations that enable human life to exist as this or that particulat, 
collective life. As Michael Ignatieff rightly observes: ' ... it is not 
the naked body we share in common, but the astoundingly different 
ways in which we decorate, adorn, perfume, and costume our 
bodies in order to proclaim our identities as men, women, members 
of this tribe or that community',23 
The increasing engagement of all world cultures with different 
others is not-as recent events clearly show-all 'good news'. 
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However, it is not all 'bad news' either. The global nature of 
human rights debates brings many and diverse actors together to 
deliberate, disagree, exchange ideas, and make the unfamiliar a 
little more familiar. Such engagement challenges another element 
of social contract philosophy, namely, the notion that each State 
stands in relation to every other as does each man to other men in 
the state of nature: that is, as natural enemies. In so far as human 
rights aspire to stand above States, they encourage at least three 
edifying effects: 
(i) Engagement with and knowledge about diverse cultures both 
makes visible and acts to contextualise the multiplicity of social 
imaginaries-the multiple ways in which we make ourselves 
human. For women, this intel11ational context provides a new 
space in which women's counter-imaginaries gain a more 
enduring publicity. A growing intel11ational women's 'public' 
is one promising feature of the intel11ationalisation of human 
rights. 
(ii) To the degree that any given culture's imaginaries are able to 
be understood, it becomes possible, also, to make sense of 
local normative behaviour, however 'bizarre' or 'objectionable' 
that behaviour may seem to an 'outsider'. 
(iii) If the claim about the permanence and the ubiquity of social 
imaginaries is correct then our freedom in relation to them lies 
in trying to understand how imagining them otherwise could 
result in more inclusive forms of sociability with greater 
opportunities for all to develop and express their capacities. If 
the idea, the vision, of human rights is to be useful to those 
whose freedoms are trammelled, then human rights must be 
kept open to local re-interpretation, adaptation and application, 
in short, transformation. 
The universal reach and scope of Human Rights may be one 
of the strongest provocations and supports available to women 
worldwide to express their freedom to participate in the 
reimagining and reinvention of the various traditions and values 
of their cultures. If human rights are to come to accommodate 
women's rights then women's quintessentially human capacity 
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for VISIOn and imagination will need to be recognised by the 
various communities and nations to which they belong, including 
the international human rights community. 
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